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Workers' Compensation
H. Alston Johnson*
Legislative Developments
The 1991 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, at least in
the context of workers' compensation, appeared to be the lull before
the storm. Assuming that a new gubernatorial term might produce new
proposals in the workers' compensation field regardless of the holder
of the office, the legislature appeared to be marking time, waiting for
that occurrence. Nine different acts altering the Workers' Compensation
Act passed, but no one of them could be considered a major change
in the Act.
The amendment creating a state-backed insurance pool caused the
most public discussion,' but its focus is entirely on financial issues for
employers and not on legal issues which they face. According to its
preamble, the amendment is intended to provide a residual market for
those employers who have in good faith, but without success, sought
compensation coverage in the voluntary insurance market. The so-called
"assigned risk pool" for workers' compensationz is discontinued as of
September 30, 1992, with the intent that it is to be replaced by the
insurance offered by this newly-created Louisiana Workers' Compen-
sation Corporation.' The amendment was made subject to voter approval
of a constitutional amendment. 4
In another act,' the peculiar procedural concept of a "preliminary
judgment" against a compensation defendant who failed to answer timely
has been replaced by a default judgment more akin to the normal
default judgment outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1316 had for years authorized a "preliminary judg-
Copyright 1992, by LouIIAA LAw REvmw.
' Member. Louisiana State Bar Association; Adjunct Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University.
I. 1991 La. Acts No. 814, enacting La. R.S. 23:1391-1415 and La. R.S. 22:1047(J).
(L), contingent upon voter approval of a constitutional amendment, which passed as 1991
La. Acts No. 1073.
2. La. R.S. 22:1417(A) (1978 and Supp. 1991).
3. 1991 La. Acts No. 814, enacting La. R.S. 23:1401.
4. Id.
5. 1991 La. Acts No. 731, amending La. R.S. 23:1316 and enacting La. R.S.
23:1316.1.
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ment" upon the "simple request" of the petitioner when the petition
for workers' compensation had not been timely answered.6 This "pre-
liminary judgment" would require the payment of weekly benefits7 until
such time as the defendant requested a hearing on the merits. This
procedure was unusual and quite effective. The "preliminary judgment"
was interlocutory and not appealable, 8 and usually provided the claimant
with quite sufficient protection against delay by the defendant. It had
recently become unclear, however, whether the device of a default judg-
ment might also be available to the claimant.9 Act 731 clarifies the
situation by repealing the reference to a preliminary judgment and
providing for a default judgment procedure not dissimilar to that which
one finds in the Code of Civil Procedure in ordinary civil proceedings. 0
Another enactment of the 1991 Regular Session moves provisions
first passed .in 1985 from Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1261 to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1021 (the definition section of the Act) without
substantive change. These provisions state that when a part-time em-
ployee is engaged in successive employments, the employer in whose
employ he is injured is the proper compensation defendant, and that
the benefits will be based on the average weekly hours which he worked
in all of his employment or forty hours, whichever is less." The same
act adds a provision to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021 to provide
for the definition and calculation of the average weekly wage of a
claimant engaged in "seasonal employment.' ' 2
The remaining enactments are minor procedural changes, 3 technical
corrections,' 4 or provisions specifically relating to insurance coverages. 5
6. La. R.S. 23:1316 (1985) and the comments following.
7. Dubois v. Diamond M. Co., 559 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
563 So. 2d 866 (1990), held that the preliminary judgment device was not available with
regard to medical expenses.
8. Flot v. Transportation Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 1221 (La. 1988).
9. Compare Auburn County v. Sheraton Hotel, 559 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1990) (holding that the preliminary judgment device is not exclusive and that a claimant
would be entitled to take and confirm a default judgment if he follows the procedure
outlined by the Code of Civil Procedure) with King v. Employers Casualty Co.. 515 So.
2d 542 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (indicating that a claimant must pursue the preliminary
judgment route rather than the final default judgment device).
10. 1991 La. Acts No. 731, amending La. R.S. 23:1316 and enacting La. R.S.
23:1316.1.
11. 1991 La. Acts No. 565, enacting La. R.S. 23:1021(10)(a)(iv) and repealing La.
R.S. 23:1261, which had first been passed in 1985.
12. 1991 La. Acts No. 565, enacting La. R.S. 23:1021(10)(a)(v).
13. 1991 La. Acts No. 468, amending La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(d), makes the reference
to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders presented by the American
Psychiatric Association, now found in the 'definition section and applicable in the past
only to mental injury caused by physical injury, equally applicable to mental injury caused
by mental stress. 1991 La. Acts No. 849, enacting La. R.S. 23:1310.1(D), provides that
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Jurisprudence
Employment Status: Independent Contractor Issues
In a series of cases during this term, our courts were required to
revisit the issue of whether a particular claimant enjoyed employment
status at the time of an injury. In some instances, the question of
whether the claimant might be considered an independent contractor not
entitled to compensation benefits was paramount.
In Hanks v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co.,'" the third circuit reached the
predictable conclusion that a temporarily disabled employee is still an
employee. The claimant had suffered a wrist injury and was still con-
valescing when he was honored at a banquet for five years of service.
The awards banquet was at a local club, and he managed to slip and
hurt his back during his attendance at the affair. Several days thereafter,
benefits for his wrist injury were terminated, and coverage for the
banquet back injury was denied. Very predictably, he sued.
The employer contended that the plaintiff was not an "employee"
at the time of the back injury, apparently on the basis that he was not
actually working at that time. But his name remained on the roll of
employees, a premium was paid for his group health insurance, he was
invited to the banquet, to which only employees were invited, and, most
significantly, his period of convalescence was counted toward the five
years of service for which he received an award of a shotgun. The court
the administrative hearing officers are .to be appointed within applicable civil service
regulations for five-year terms but are subject to removal for cause. Re-appointment is
permitted, but these term provisions are not applicable to hearing officers appointed before
the effective date of the Act. 1991 La. Acts No. 892, amending various sections of the
Act, specifically provides for the use of medical utilization review procedures and clarifies
the procedure for initiating claims and filing answers, bringing the procedure more in line
with the procedure for ordinary litigation.
14. 1991 La. Acts No. 469, amending La. R.S. 23:1225(C)(1) restores to that provision
some language inadvertently left out of a prior amendment and makes it clear that
compensation benefits may be reduced when an employee receives remuneration from
other sources such as social security benefits and disability benefits from a plan funded
wholly or partially by -the employer.
15. 1991 La. Acts No. 13, amending La. R.S. 23:1191, deletes the requirement that
those groups of employers who are members of the same bona fide trade or professional
association and wish to be self-insured must also be engaged in "the same or similar
type of business." 1991 La. Acts No. 1026, enacting subpart H-I of part I of ch. 10 of
Title 23 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, comprised of La. R.S. 23:1175-1180,
and repealing La. R.S. 22:1415(E), provides for a comprehensive program of health and
safety education and training supervised by the Office of Worker's Compensation Ad-
ministration, in an attempt to reduce occupational accidents and decrease compensation
insurance rates for employers in high-rate classifications.
16. 574 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 32 (1991).
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concluded that although he was "temporarily absent from his employ-
ment duties," he was nonetheless still an employee.
Employment status also arose in Dye v. Ipik Door Co.," but in an
unusual context. The claimant was a hydraulic engineer employed by
the defendant and injured while doing certain repair work on the de-
fendant's premises. He received workers' compensation benefits. One
year after his injury, he brought a tort suit against the employer, alleging
that he was an independent contractor excluded from compensation
benefits rather than an employee. The trial judge felt that independent
contractor status had not been established, but held that the claimant
was estopped from asserting a tort action because he had accepted
compensation benefits, thereby admitting his employment status.
The appellate court disagreed, noting that equitable estoppel is only
rarely applied in Louisiana cases. The fifth circuit also observed that
the claimant was entitled to proceed in the alternative, and that there
was no risk of "double recovery" since the employer would be entitled
to a credit for any amounts previously paid in compensation.
The status of the claimant as an independent contractor was the
focal point in three other decisions.' 8 Much of the discussion would
appear to have been unnecessary, since Section 1021(6) of the Act' 9
extends coverage even to non-employees if they are independent con-
tractors who spend a substantial part of their work time in manual
labor in carrying out the terms of the contract. Thus the actual name
given to a laborer, whether employee or independent contractor, is of
little moment if the laborer spends a substantial part of his work time
in manual labor to fulfill his "independent contract" responsibilities.
This concept, dating from 1948, should have, and indeed has in most
instances, obviated most of the debate over compensability of injuries
to such persons.
Nevertheless, from time to time, the issue still occupies some of the
time of the appellate courts. The opinion in Franklin v. Checker Cab
Co.,20 in support of its denial of workers' compensation to a cab driver's
family following his death in a vehicular accident, repeats a jurispru-
dential gloss on the concept which is entirely without statutory foun-
dation. The opinion quotes Section 1021(6), paraphrased in the preceding
paragraph, and then states that a person may be considered such an
independent contractor entitled to benefits only if that language is sat-
isfied and the work which he performs "is part of the principal's trade,
17. 570 So. 2d 477 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
18. See infra notes 20, 23, and 25 and accompanying text.
19. La. R.S. 23:1021(6) (1985), defining independent contractor.
20. 572 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
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business or occupation."'" This language is not found in Section 1021(6).
Finding that Checker Cab was "not in the taxicab business" but only
leased "cabs, . . . radio service and goodwill to cab drivers on a daily
basis," the court concluded that the work being performed by the
deceased driver was not part of the defendant's trade, business or
occupation.2 While common sense is not always a good guide to proper
legal results, it does seem strange to conclude that the entity which
leases cabs, radio service and goodwill to cab drivers on a daily basis
is "not in the taxicab business." If not, what business is it in?
In two other decisions, the result was more predictable, though in
each it appears that the outcome should probably have been the same
whether the individual was classified as an employee or an independent
contractor engaged in manual labor for a substantial portion of the
work time in carrying out the contract.
In Stutes v. Rossclaire Construction, Inc.," a carpenter who had
resigned sued for past due wages; his employer denied his employment
status, and alleged the affirmative defense of offset in the amount of
the premiums paid for workers' compensation coverage on his behalf.
The defendant found in the end that it had pleaded too much. The
court held that the carpenter was an employee (though a finding that
he was a "working" independent contractor would have accomplished
the same purpose), and that accordingly the Act prohibited any payment
by him, directly or indirectly, for the cost of compensation. 4 It followed
that the offset had to be denied.
Finally, in Withers v. Timber Products, Inc.," it was held, consistent
with numerous earlier cases, that a hauler of wood chips from a timber
mill to a purchaser was an employee and entitled to compensation from
the mill, which exercised complete control of the hauling, as well as
21. Id. at 774. The opinion cites Lushute v. Diesi, 354 So. 2d 179 (La. 1977) and
La. R.S. 23:1061 as authority for this statement in addition to La. R.S. 23:1021(6) itself.
The latter provision does not contain that language. Section 1061, though it does contain
the language about the trade, business or occupation of an individual, concerns the
compensation rights of the employees of an independent contractor, not the rights of the
independent contractor himself. And, the decision in Lushute which first added that gloss
to the statute did so without persuasive authority, was unduly restrictive when it was
decided, and remains so now. See the criticism in W. Malone and H. Johnson, Louisiana
Workers' Compensation Law and Practice, in 13 La. Civil Law Treatise ) 78 at 145-46
(1980), and especially the prediction in the supplement at note 7 of ) 78 that this error
would prove particularly troublesome when, as in Franklin, the issue was recovery of
compensation benefits rather than tort immunity.
22. Franklin, 572 So. 2d at 774.
23. 575 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
24. La. R.S. 23:1163 (1985).
25. 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 378, reconsideration
denied, 581 So. 2d 699 (1991).
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"the right to direct when and to whom the wood chips were to be
hauled." 2 6
Mental Stress
Two decisions during this term demonstrate the inherent difficulty
in adjudicating mental disability cases, particularly when there are com-
peting streams of causation, some work-related and some not. On the
surface, although the two cases differ only slightly dn the facts, different
results were reached. Perhaps the full record, not reflected in the ap-
pellate opinions, might reveal the reason for the difference in results.
In Frederick v. Town of Arnaudville," the claimant had a long and
checkered history of employment with the town police department. Some
ten years before the incident which produced his compensation claim,
he had been shot while in the line of duty. On several occasions there-
after, he had taken a leave of absence "for nerves." On the day in
question, he "had words" with his supervisor and one hour later found
himself in the emergency room with symptoms mimicking a heart attack.
It was diagnosed as "purely an emotional upset," but there appeared
to be no dispute that the claimant was thereafter totally disabled. The
issue to be resolved was whether there was an "accident." The appellate
court agreed with the trial court that there was. Though the court
pointed to past mental problems as well as the incident with his su-
pervisor, only the latter was really pertinent to the issue of whether an
accident had occurred. 28
The Frederick court noted and specifically distinguished the other
decision, in McDonald v. American General Fire and Casualty Co."9 In
McDonald, there was again an incident on a given day with the claimant's
supervisor. There was a history of stress on the worker outside the
workplace, including marital and serious financial problems. The trial
judge concluded that the claimant had experienced "an every day business
occurrence requiring an every day business adjustment." 30 Compensation
was denied, and that result was affirmed by the appellate court, which
noted that a condition previously chronic had simply been made acute
by the confrontation with his supervisor.
There is little here to assist the scholar of workers' compensation
law. In each instance, the worker came to the workplace with a pre-
disposition to injury, albeit mental rather than physical. Such a person
ordinarily is entitled to compensation if his predisposition combines with
26. Id. at 1293.
27. 572 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So. 2d 873 (1991).
28. Id. at 317-19.
29. 570 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 90 (1991).
30. Id. at 100.
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a workplace incident to cause disability. But in each instance, the work-
place incident was minor and, in an objective sense, should not have
resulted in a disabling injury. The difference in result demonstrates
vividly how competing employment and non-employment causes call
cloud the issues. Both decisions antedate the 1989 amendments to the
Act which would have required that the mental injury be demonstrated
by "clear and convincing evidence" and be the result of "sudden,
unexpected and extraordinary stress."'" Under that rubric, the successful
claim might have failed.
Rehabilitation
Our courts are gradually filling out the concept of rehabilitation
introduced into the Act in 1983. Although the Act contains a rather
elaborate discussion of rehabilitation services which the employer i,
required to provide, the practical application of these provisions has
remained somewhat unclear. Two decisions during this term shed some
light on the issue.
In Federated Rural Electric v. Simmons, 2 the employer had instituted
a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that compensation
benefits should be reduced because the employee had failed to cooperate
with rehabilitation efforts. In the end, the employer's effort was un-
successful because the court determined that its rehabilitation efforts
were more form than substance. The evidence established that the first
rehabilitation "expert" had seriously misjudged the claimant's physical
situation and his educational background, and as a consequence, had
not chosen an appropriate rehabilitation plan. The second "expert"
performed a labor market survey from examining the want ads. He
never met the claimant and never dealt directly with any prospective
employers. It seems clear that these efforts are not of the caliber en-
visioned by the Act, and it is not surprising that the employer was not
successful in its declaratory judgment action.
In the second decision, the persuasiveness of the result is less com-
pelling. In Vidrine v. Savoy Medical Center, Inc.,13 the employer had
been ordered to provide rehabilitation services in computer repair training
at a private institution for a year. The employer objected on the ground
that only twenty-six weeks (with an option to request an additional
twenty-six weeks) at a maximum was authorized under the statute, and
that objection was determined to be well-founded. It also objected that
the use of a private rehabilitation service was authorized only when no
public entity offered a similar service. Since a public vocational-technical
31. La. R.S. 23:1021 (7)(b) (1985 and Supp. 1991).
32. 568 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 3d Cir.). writ denied, 571 So. 2d 655 (1990).
33. 576 So. 2d 1181 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
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school offered a training course in industrial electronics, the employer
thought that such training should have been ordered. The appellate court
agreed with the trial judge and rejected the employer's position, but
the court's reasoning seems flawed. Essentially, the appellate court con-
cluded that the public program would not supply "appropriate training
and education ' 4 because that course "did not interest" the claimant. 5
With all respect, while the claimant's cooperation is no doubt important,
one can hardly expect rehabilitation services to be precisely what the
claimant would prefer. If the claimant effectively has a veto power over
rehabilitation services offered to him, there is significant potential for
abuse.
Intentional Tort Exclusion
Our courts have shown themselves to be very appropriately dubious
of claims of intentional tort in the workplace, and of the concomitant
attempted escape into the tort system. While no one approves of per-
mitting an intentional wrongdoer to hide behind the immunity afforded
by the Act, there is serious danger of undermining the Act by broadly
defining what constitutes an intentional tort for these purposes.
Despite the fact that the courts have been suitably narrow in their
interpretations, the effort to widen the exception seems to be endless.
During this term alone, there were at least a dozen decisions dealing
with the issue,36 and with one exception, the claimant was unsuccessful
34. Id. at 1182, quoting from La. R.S. 23:1226(A).
35. Id. at 1182.
36' Fricke v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 571 So. 2d 130 (La. 1990) (summary
judgment reinstated and affirmed by supreme court; supervisor did not commit intentional
tort in acquiescing in employee's descent into tank to rescue another worker who had
been overcome by toxic mustard vapors); Van Alton v. Fisk Electric, Inc., 581 So. 2d
1080 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (two different summary judgments in defendants' favor
reversed by appellate courts; after full trial, judgment in defendants' favor affirmed; no
showing of intentional tort when co-employee handed voltage meter to plaintiff during
electrical repair and both were injured); King v. Schuylkill Metals Corp., 581 So. 2d 300
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1163 (1991) (summary judgment in defendant's
favor affirmed; cleaning of screw conveyor without shutting off power upon instruction
of supervisor did not establish intentional tort); Mathew v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co.,
578 So. 2d 242 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (summary judgment in defendants' favor affirmed;
failure to provide safety nets not an intentional tort); Cousineau v. Johnson, 577 So. 2d
152 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 379 (1991) (attack by co-employee in
bunkhouse was an intentional tort but so outside the employment that employer was not
vicariously liable); Hudson v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., 573 So. 2d 1284 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1991) (directed verdict in defendants' favor affirmed; fall in hole in trailer bed
of 18-wheeler not an intentional tort); Hurst v. Massey, 570 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1990), writ denied, 573 So. 2d 1123 (1991) (after trial on second remand, rejection
of intentional tort claim was affirmed where plant officials could not have known that,
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in establishing liability on the part of the employer. In. many instances,
the matter Was dealt with by summary judgment or even peremptory
exception. Too much time is being spent by too many on spurious claims
of intentional tort. There are other problems in the Act which should
be occupying judicial time.
Indemnity of Tortfeasor by Employer
Decisions during this term confirm that an employer who would
otherwise be immune from the payment of tort damages may contrac-
tually agree to assume that risk from a person or entity who might
ultimately be cast for tort damages in a suit by an employee of that
employer. In Yocum v. City of Minden,3 for example, it was held that
there was no prohibition in the Act against an indemnity agreement
calling for the employer to hold an alleged tortfeasor harmless with
respect to a suit by the employer's employee, but the issues of fact
precluded a determination of the scope of that indemnity by summary
judgment. Similarly in Berninger v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.," the court
held that an indemnity agreement was enforceable, and that a claim
against the indemnitor may be made by third-party demand during the
pendency of the tort litigation.
In certain instances, the injured employee himself might become the
indemnitor as to a part of the obligation, as in the situation in which
he settles the tort claim and agrees to indemnify the tortfeasor against
any remaining claims of his own employer? 9
as a result of their actions, co-worker would be fatally shot by striking union member);
Mahfouz v. J.A.C.E. Oilfield Sales and Serv., Inc., 569 So. 2d 1074 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1990) (summary judgment in employer's favor affirmed; allegation that employer knew
of pre-existing back condition following employment physical but failed to reveal limitations
imposed by it to employee insufficient to establish intentional tort); Gray v. Mclnnis
Bros. Constr., Inc., 569 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990) (summary judgment in
employer's favor affirmed; injury from falling scaffolding after employer ordered removal
of guardrails not an intentional tort); Dycus v. Martin Marietta Corp., 568 So. 2d 592
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 649 (1990) (summary judgment in employer's
favor affirmed; shock from apparent wiring problem in welding machine insufficient to
establish intentional tort); Bonin v. Bon Elec. Contractors, Inc., 567 So. 2d 766 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1990) (summary judgment in employer's favor affirmed; injury when worker's
foot was caught in cable and he was hoisted up the elevator shaft not an intentional
tort). The only exception was Wallace v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem., 586 So. 2d 149
(La. 1991), in which the supreme court reversed the sustaining of an exception of no
cause of action.
37. 566 So. 2d 1082 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
38. 582 So. 2d 266 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
39. See Hermann v. Dockside Linemen, Inc., 583 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1991).
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Rights Upon Settlement
The rights of the various parties upon settlement of a tort claim
continue to be the source of litigation. The teaching of the cases reported
during this term is consistent with that of prior decisions: a compensation
payor who wishes to be reimbursed would do well to intervene and
participate vigorously in the employee's tort action. In Rice v. Flour
Constructors, Inc.,10 the intervening compensation carrier did not par-
ticipate actively in the liability phase of the trial of the tort actions and
actually voluntarily dismissed its intervention in the claim at issue. After
that claimant had received payment of the tort judgment in his favor,
he pressed his compensation claim and resisted the effort of the com-
pensation carrier to take a credit against the compensation obligation
in the amount of the tort judgment. The appellate court reversed the
trial court and refused to permit the credit on the ground that the
carrier had intervened but then voluntarily dismissed its intervention,
thus failing to prove its right to reimbursement.
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Whitmire,*' the alleged
tortfeasor had settled the employee's tort claim prior to suit actually
being filed and without any notice that the employee might be entitled
to compensation or might actually be drawing compensation. In fact,
compensation benefits had been paid, but when the compensation carrier
invoked Section 110242 in an attempt to receive reimbursement from the
settling tortfeasor, its effort was rebuffed. The appellate court was
unwilling to put the risk of non-notice on the settling tortfeasor as
opposed to the compensation carrier, which does not seem inappropriate
since it is the compensation carrier which has paid the benefits and
seeks their reimbursement. A concurring judge suggested legislative cor-
rection in this situation to require a settling tortfeasor to furnish proof
that a bona fide effort was made to determine whether a compensation
claim was involved.
Another piece of the puzzle was faced in Durham Pontiac-Cadillac-
GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Phillips. 43 The employer had been cast in judgment
for workers' compensation benefits, but had no knowledge of a tort
action which was pending. Subsequently, that tort action was settled,
and the employee obtained a rather substantial sum. When the employee
sought to enforce his compensation judgment despite the tort recovery,
40. 577 So. 2d 1054 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991). The defendant's name should probably
have been Fluor, but the spelling is consistent throughout the opinion.
41. 578 So. 2d 1180 (La. App. 5th.Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 707 (1991).
42. La. R.S. 23:1102(C) (1985), which provides that a tortfeasor will owe reimburse-
ment to a compensation carrier for compensation benefits paid when the tortfeasor settles
the employee's tort claim without the written approval of the compensation carrier.
43. 572 So. 2d 1080 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990).
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the employer brought suit against the employee (not the tortfeasor) for
a declaratory judgment that the tort settlement confected without its
knowledge satisfied its compensation obligation. The appellate court
upheld the suit against an exception of no cause of action.
Miscellaneous
There are a few additional decisions worthy of a brief mention. II
Sampson v. Wendy's Management, Inc.," the supreme court, reversing
the second circuit's holding that a claim for damages due to retaliatory
discharge under Section 136 1 is properly considered a workers' com-
pensation matter and thus is properly filed with the Office of Workers'
Compensation Administration as are all other workers' compensation
claims, concluded that the action was delictual in nature and should be
filed with the district court. This seems short-sighted. The action is not
a separate tort action; rather, it is a method of assuring that benefits
under the Act are payable in appropriate cases without improper pun.-
ishment of an employee for asserting his rights.
In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Landry," the court refused
to permit reimbursement of a compensation carrier which had errone-
ously paid the $20,000.00 death benefit to the mother of a deceased
employee on the belief that the employee had died without dependents.
It turned out that he did have dependents-an illegitimate child and the
child's mother. The insurer had settled their claim and then sought
recovery of the originally-paid death benefit from the mother. The court
predictably held that the payment to the mother was a compromise,
44. 1992 WL 10096, 1992 La. LEXIS 100 (La. 1992) (No. 91-CC-1281), rev'g. 580
So. 2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
45. La. R.S. 23:1361 (1985) as cited in Sampson. 580 So. 2d at 432, quoting from
W. Malone and H. Johnson, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 362.5 in 14
La. Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980); Johnson, Worker's Compensation, Developments
in the Law, 1985-1986, 47 La. L. Rev. 521 (1987). But see Maquar v. Transit Management
of Southeast La., 580 So. 2d 1128 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 584 So. 2d 662
(1991), where the court held that prescription running against a claim for damages for
retaliatory discharge is not interrupted by a filing with the Office of Workers' Compen-
sation, but only by filing in a "court of competent jurisdiction." Maquar, id. at 1129.
This anomaly is particularly troublesome now that district courts no longer have any
jurisdiction over workers' compensation matters at all, with claims proceeding directly
from administrative hearing officers to the appropriate courts of appeal. It makes little
sense for district courts to be hearing claims for damages arising from discharge as a
result of filing a compensation claim, when they do not have jurisdiction to deal with
compensation claims at all. If legislation is required, it should be enacted. But it is just
as easy to state clearly that the cause of action under Section 1361 is a compensation
matter as much as the claim itself and to hold that it should be initiated by a filing with
the OWCA for hearing by an administrative hearing officer.
46. 578 So. 2d 537 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
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and that such a compromise could not be rescinded on the basis of an
error of law.
The issue of reimbursement of a compensation carrier from an
uninsured motorist policy was faced during this term in two different
factual contexts. In one case, the employee in question was driving a
rental vehicle at the time of the work-related accident, and that vehicle
was insured for uninsured motorist coverage as well as other coverages.",
The cost of that vehicle was being paid by her own insurer under a
clause requiring such payment while her own vehicle was being repaired
due to an earlier accident. Accordingly, the employee argued that under
established authority"8 she had indirectly paid the cost of the uninsured
motorist coverage on the rental vehicle by paying premiums to her own
insurer, and thus the compensation carrier which had paid compensation
benefits to her should not be entitled to reimbursement against the
uninsured motorist coverage. The appellate court agreed, reversing the
trial court.
In a second case, the employee could not demonstrate that she had
borne the cost of uninsured motorist coverage, even indirectly, and thus
had no ground to complain that her, employer was entitled to reim-
bursement from an uninsured motorist award to plaintiff without any
credit for her employer's self-insured retention limit.4 9
47. Townsend v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 569 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
writ denied, 572 So. 2d 72 (1991).
48. Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 224 (La. 1982).
49. Desormeaux v. Lalonde, 578 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 581
So. 2d 705 (1991).
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